We study the role of the synchronization risk in allowing stock prices to rise during the recent technology bubble. In a recent theory by Abreu and Brunnermeier (Journal of Financial Economics 2002; Econometrica 2003) synchronization risk leads to market timing by arbitrageurs and delays arbitrage. Therefore, in the presence of synchronization risk and the need for coordination in attacking a bubble, asset prices may inflate to an extreme extent. We obtain several results. We show how a measure of preferences toward risk of investors in technology stocks can be used to study the presence of synchronization risk. We show that changes in measured investor risk preferences are closely related to changes in the demand for stocks and affect trading activity. We also show that changes in investor preferences and attitudes were different across different technology stocks. Structural changes in risk preferences took place at different points in time for different stocks in the sample. We infer from this evidence that coordination risk may indeed have been present, making the job of arbitrageurs difficult or impossible. This supports synchronization risk theory. We also observe a dramatic change in aggregate risk preferences across NASDAQ technology stocks during the bubble collapse. 
Introduction
Periods of fast rise in prices, followed by rapid declines-termed "bubbles" and "crashes"-stimulate economic debate on the reasons behind wide swings in asset values. Recent theoretical and empirical work suggests that bubbles can inflate even if there are large numbers of highly capitalized, rational arbitrageurs. Brunnermeier (2002, 2003) argue that bubbles can persist in the presence of rational arbitrageurs who experience a synchronization problem or inability to coordinate their trading strategies. This occurs when arbitrageurs lack the power to offset irrational exuberance unless they can coordinate their attacks on the bubble. Synchronization risk arises from arbitrageur's uncertainty about when other arbitrageurs will start exploiting a common arbitrage opportunity Brunnermeier, 2002 and . The arbitrage opportunity appears when prices move away from fundamental values. In a market populated by rational investors this arbitrage opportunity will be immediately explored. However, the recent literature provides evidence that small noise traders can drive prices significantly further from fundamentals (Barber, Odean and Zhu 2006; Hvidkjaer 2006) . The effect of noise traders is driven by market preferences or sentiment . If the small investors are optimistic about the stock they will exert buying pressure and move the prices further up from fundamental value. In this situation arbitrage is no longer risk-less. Arbitragers acquire another factor to account for -investor preferences towards a particular stock or a particular type of stocks.
If, for example, arbitrager observes that the stock is overpriced and wants to enter a short position he might face the risk that the stock will be even more overpriced in the future. If arbitrager cannot predict investors' preferences towards the stock, or for how long the market is going to be optimistic about the stock, the arbitrage becomes impossible. Synchronization risk, therefore, leads to market timing by arbitrageurs and delays arbitrage.
Understanding the nature of synchronization risk is important for the interpretation of the recent rise and fall in technology stock prices. Empirical evidence on the nature of synchronization risk, however, is difficult to obtain. This is partly because the behavior of investors and their impact on prices is hard to observe simultaneously.
1 Temin and Voth (2004) use trading behavior of an informed investor during the South Sea bubble in 1720's and find support for the synchronization 1 Brav and Heaton (2002) explore other fundamental reasons for the difficulty of separating competing theories of financial anomalies. They find that "behavioral" theories built on investor irrationality, and "traditional structural uncertainty" theories built on incomplete information about the structure of the economy, have many mathematical and predictive similarities. The theories are difficult to distinguish, in spite of the fact that they relax opposite assumptions of the rational expectations paradigm.
risk hypothesis. They show that the need for coordination in attacking the South Sea bubble was the key to allowing it to inflate.
In this paper we focus on the behavior of the technology stocks during the period from 1996 to 2003. 2 We develop a measure that reflects important characteristic of investors in technology stocks-an estimate of investor risk aversion. Bakshi and Wu (2006) show that information in options on the NASDAQ 100 Index can be used to measure the degree of investor irrationality during NASDAQ bubble. Closely related are the methods developed in Bliss and Panigirtzoglou, (2004) and Jackwerth (2000) that show how equity options on an asset and the returns on this asset can be used jointly to extract preferences toward risk of investors in the asset. 3 We measure preferences toward risk of investors in technology stocks by estimating the value of risk aversion for the stocks in XCI Index for the period from 1996 through 2003. This is a major index of technology stocks. Our estimates capture variation in attitudes of investors in individual stocks.
As suggested by Shleifer and Summers (1990) , change in investors' beliefs, investor sentiment, or attitude toward risk affect the demand for risky assets. Therefore, changes in demand associated with change in risk preferences should be reflected in trading activity. We explicitly test this hypothesis. We find that changes in investor risk preferences are an important determinant of the demand for company shares and of the stock trading activity. Changes in risk preferences are closely related to trading activity. In particular, changes in company specific risk preferences are positively and significantly related to turnover. Our results are established at the level of individual technology stocks. This result survives when, in addition to change in risk preferences at the company level, we control for changes in the aggregate, market-level, preferences toward risk.
Our first conclusion is that changes in risk preferences of investors in a stock are closely related to the demand for shares. When this is the case, stocks that experience similar changes in investor risk preferences may be expected to experience similar shifts in demand and therefore exhibit similarities in their patterns of stock returns and other economic variables that capture stock trading activity. We test this and we find that stocks with similar behavior of investor risk aversion also display similarity in other economic characteristics:
• Stocks, for which risk aversion changes in a similar way also tend to have similar returns.
• Stocks that have similar changes in investor preferences are also categorized by similar trading behavior (share turnover).
• Stocks with similar changes in risk aversion have similar changes in liquidity.
The results suggest that preferences toward risk on individual stock level are a significant determinant of demand for the stock and of the stock price behavior. This, conclusion is consistent with the literature which argues that individual investors can drive stock prices (Barber, Odean and Zhu (2006), Hvidkjaer (2006) ).
Next, we turn to the recent rise and fall of prices of technology stocks. If the technology price bubble was driven by similar changes in investor attitudes (or sentiment) across the technology stocks than we would expect similarities in the behavior of the estimated risk preferences for investors in these stocks. Specifically, the major event of this period--collapse of prices in March 2000--should be observed in all the measures for all stocks approximately at the same point in time.
To test for coordination risk we run a test of structural break for each time series of risk aversion.
The structural break in risk aversion can be associated with a significant change in market sentiment about the stock. For example the change from optimism to pessimism would result in change in trading behavior, a change from buying to selling. This would lead to significant price decline and eventually be reflected as a structural break in time series of estimated risk preferences. This change in trading strategies was observed during the bubble: hedge funds were riding the bubble till March 2000 and they pooled out before the bubble burst (Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2004) . Therefore, the change in market opinion about the stock or the signal of whether to continue or withdraw from investing into the stock should be reflected as a structural break (breaks) in estimated risk aversion.
We first test for one structural break at unknown date using methodology of Bai, Lumsdaine, and Stock (1998) . The advantage of this test is that it does not take an a priori stand on the date of a structural change. We, therefore, adopt a flexible approach and let the data determine the date of a structural change for each stock in the sample. We find that different stocks have structural breaks at different times. It means that investors' behavior in each individual stock was independent from other stocks in the same industry (all stocks in the sample are NASDAQ technology stocks and are members of a major technology index). It further suggests that similar stocks had different levels of either optimism or pessimism during the bubble. The arbitrage becomes very difficult in the situation like this. Arbitragers could not predict on average for how long the market optimism about the bubble is going to persist. Shleifer and Summers (1990) argue that this makes arbitrage a risky strategy, and Brunnermeier (2002, 2003) suggest that it leads to a synchronization risk.
We further allow for three structural breaks at unknown dates. Three structural breaks in estimated risk preferences are consistent with the interpretation where first, market shifts from a "normal" state into a "bubble period," second, the bubble bursts and a decline begins (a "crash" takes place), and finally the prices enter the stable period again. Our stand here is that if coordination among arbitragers was possible than the second period for each individual stock should come on March or April of 2000. March of 2000 is the last month when prices peaked up and we would expect the structural shift in risk preferences either at this time or in April of 2000 if arbitragers can forecast market optimism and pool out before the prices collapsed. 4 Only one stock
out of twenty one we analyze and the XCI index has structural breaks associated with our null
hypothesis. This provides further support of coordination failure and synchronization risk advocated by Brunnermeier (2002, 2003 (Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2004) , this result suggests that arbitragers were able to predict the aggregate structural change in market optimism and pooled out before it changed. In aggregate, markets had a predictable change in preference which, as we find, coincides with the time of bubble burst.
Overall, we infer from this evidence that coordination risk may indeed have been present, making the job of arbitrageurs difficult or impossible. This supports synchronization risk theory. We also observe a dramatic change in aggregate risk preferences across NASDAQ technology stocks during the bubble collapse.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes methodology and data.
Section III characterizes the relationship between risk aversion, trading activity and other market variables. Sections IV and V describe the structural break tests and the results. Section VI concludes.
II. Methodology and Data
To assess presence of synchronization risk we build a measure of stock-specific characteristics of the representative investor in this stock-investor risk preferences. In this section we discuss how the marginal investor's risk aversion for a particular stock can be estimated from the data on stock returns and options written on the stock.
Recovering Risk Aversion
An estimate of risk aversion can be obtained from asset prices. There is a relationship between the risk-neutral probability distribution of returns on a stock i , ( ) T i S P , , subjective (true) probability distribution ( ) T i S Q , , and investor risk aversion. The relation is,
is the investor's time-separable utility of wealth. Therefore, knowing the subjective distribution and the risk neutral distribution is sufficient to find risk aversion.
To determine the two distributions, we combine the methodologies of Panigirtzoglou (2002, 2004) and Jackwerth (2000) . Using option prices for a particular underlying 5 See, for example, discussion in Jackwerth (2000) .
stock, we estimate the risk-neutral probability density function (PDF) according to Panigirtzoglou (2002, 2004) . We then use five years of past monthly stock returns to determine a risk-adjusted (or, subjective) PDF using a nonparametric kernel density estimator similar to the one used in Jackwerth (2000) . Risk aversion is the adjustment required to transform the risk-neutral PDF into the risk-adjusted PDF. Using this method, the risk aversion coefficient can be estimated for every trading day for any asset for which option prices are available.
Risk-neutral probability distribution
To find risk-neutral distribution we use the following approach. It is known from option pricing theory that the risk-neutral PDF is embedded in option prices. Let T be the expiration date of an option. The PDF, f(S i,T ), for the underlying asset i at time T has been shown to be related to the price of the European call option, C (S i,t , K, t) , by Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) . Here, K is the option strike price and S i,t is the price of underlying i at time t where t<T. This relationship is
For each underlying asset, i , and for each expiration date, however, the function ( )
, is unknown and only a limited set of call options with different strike prices exist. Therefore, in order to calculate the second derivative we estimate a smoothing function using option prices with different strike prices but with the same expiration dates.
Instead of estimating such a smoothing function in option price/strike price space, we follow Panigirtzoglou (2002, 2004) by first mapping each option price/strike price pair to the corresponding implied volatility/delta. We fit a curve connecting the implied volatility/delta pairs using a weighted cubic spline where the option's vega is used as the weight. We take 300 points along the curve and transform them back to the option price/strike price space. We thus obtain a smoothed price function, which we numerically differentiate to produce the estimated PDF. Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2002) find that this method of estimating the implied volatility smile and the implied PDF is "remarkably free of computational problems."
A weighted natural spline is used to fit a smoothing function to the transformed raw data.
The natural spline minimizes the following function: From the estimated cubic spline curve, we take 300 equally spaced deltas and their corresponding implied volatilities and transform them back to option price/strike price space using the Black-Scholes option pricing formula that accounts for dividends paid on the stock. However, although the deltas are equally spaced, the strike prices that are obtained after the conversion are not. We use a cubic spline for a second time to fit a curve connecting the 300 unequally spaced call price/strike price pairs. This allows us to choose 300 equally spaced strike prices with their corresponding call prices. Finally, we use finite differences to estimate the second derivative of the call price with respect to the strike price. This yields the risk-neutral PDF. This procedure does not depend on a specific option pricing model (Bliss and Panigirtzoglou 2004) .
Subjective probability distributions
We use a kernel density estimator to estimate the subjective (risk-adjusted) probability density functions. Similar procedure is used in Jackwerth (2000) . 6 We use the most recent 60 months of stock return data to estimate the risk-adjusted distribution. To find estimates for January 1996, we use monthly return data from January 1991 to December 1995. All information used in the calculation is part of the investors' information set. Other windows were considered but results were highly correlated. For example, we tried a window of past returns with a lag of one year or six month, and we tried using 72 months of returns instead of 60. Varying our initial choices does not change the results.
We calculate monthly non-overlapping returns from our 5-year sample and compute the kernel density with a Gaussian kernel. The bandwidth
where h is the kernel bandwidth, σˆ is the standard deviation of the sample returns, and n is the number of observations, is selected by recommendation of Jones, Marron and Sheather (1996) .
Data
The data for this study consists of daily closing prices of call options written on the stocks that are included in the XCI Index. This is the index of 30 major technology stocks. The study covers the eight-year period from January 2, 1996 through December 31, 2003, since this is the period when prices of options are available to us. In addition to the daily closing option prices, we use monthly stock returns and daily stock closing prices from CRSP. Table 1 (2000), we estimate risk aversion with a constraint on the moneyness. Jackwerth only considers options such that the ratio of the strike price to the stock price is between 0.84 and 1.12. This procedure eliminates far-away-from-the-money observations. This may cause a problem of missing observations, but only when there are large movements in the stock price. Since options with only a few different strikes are traded for each firm (usually five or six strikes), a large enough movement in the stock price causes the money-ness to fall in a window that does not have three option contracts for us to use. We do not estimate risk aversion for such days.
Not surprising, tossing out options that are way in the money or way out of the money affects risk aversion estimates in the tales of the distribution. Our robustness checks indicate that the estimates in the middle of the distribution are generally unaffected by the money-ness constraints. We find our results to be robust to the selection of options.
For our estimation, we use options that expire between one and four months from day t.
Options on stocks generally exist with expiration dates at three-month intervals. For example, options on Microsoft expire in January, April, July, and October. Therefore, for all days in January,
we use options expiring in April. For all days in March, we use those options expiring in July. We use this approach to maintain a relatively constant horizon for our analysis, and at the same time to have a sufficient number of option contracts to obtain reliable risk aversion estimates. 
III. Trading Activity and Risk Aversion
As a first step towards understanding the connection between changes in risk preferences and asset prices we study whether changes in risk aversion are related to trading activity. Changes in demand for securities can reflect changes in risk aversion Barberis and Shleifer 2003) . If this is the case, then trading activity will be affected by changes in risk preferences.
When preferences toward risk change, investors adjust their portfolios accordingly. We conduct several tests to determine whether there is a connection between investor risk aversion and trading activity.
In the first set of tests we perform individual regressions for all companies in the sample.
For each firm we estimate a linear model,
We use turnover, t TRN , as a measure of trading activity. Turnover is defined as trading volume divided by the number of shares outstanding, for a given firm in a month t . Change of the risk aversion of investors in the stock over the month,
, is the variable whose affect on turnover we would like to assess. Past turnover can affect current turnover (Lee and Swaminathan 2000) and we include lag of turnover, 1 − t TRN , as well as lag of return on the stock, 1 − t R , in the regression. Table II reports results of these regressions. Change in risk aversion is a significant determinant of the turnover in 12 out of 21 firms in the sample.
The demand for company shares may be driven by changes in risk preferences of investors in this particular stock as well as by market-wide changes in risk aversion. These are two separate effects. Individual stocks are a part of an industry group and are also a part of the overall U.S. stock market. The demand for stocks there depends on changes in industry-wide and market-wide preferences. In view of this complication we test whether changes in risk aversion at the company level remain significant controlling for market-wide changes in preferences. To test this, we include change of the risk aversion at the market level,
, and estimate the model
We use risk aversion for the XCI Index for industry-level preferences and risk aversion for the S&P 500 Index as the market-wide measure. The results of individual company regressions are not changed. The coefficient of the change in company-specific risk aversion remains significant (Table   III) .
GLS regressions
In this section we report the results of pooled cross-section time-series regressions of the turnover on risk aversion and the control variables. By estimating simultaneously the coefficient of the risk aversion and the coefficients for control variables, we avoid the potential errors-in-variables problems associated with the traditional Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure. 7 We conduct the analysis using the data for 21 technology firms that are members of the XCI Index for which estimates of risk aversion are available. The estimation proceeds as follows. Define observations. The vector is ordered by month so that the first 21 observations correspond to the turnover in month 1. Define X as the partitioned matrix 7 Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) use this approach in their study of returns and liquidity.
where Z is a ( ) , whose influence on trading activity we wish to assess.
We first perform the OLS pooled cross-section time-series regression
where β is a 44 vector of coefficients, the first element of which is the constant term of the regression, the next element of which is the coefficient of the change in risk aversion variable, and the last 42 elements of which are the coefficients of the two control variables for the stocks ordered by security. ε is a 1 21 × T vector of errors. In our application the sample consists of monthly turnover and risk aversion changes from February 1996 to December 2003 so that 95 = T
. To obtain the GLS estimator of β , we estimate Ω , the variance-covariance matrix of errors in (1) assuming that the stock turnover errors are serially independent, but allowing for cross-sectional dependence. Then Ω is a ( )
block-diagonal matrix, whose typical element is the 21 21× covariance matrix of errors: it is estimated using the residuals from (1). The GLS estimate of β is given by ( )
where Ω is the estimate of Ω from the first-stage regressions.
The results of the GLS regression (Table IV) We repeat GLS estimation while controlling for changes in the risk preferences at the market level. To do this we modify the Z matrix to become a ( ) Controlling for market-wide changes in risk preferences does not alter our findings. The results are given in Table IV . The coefficient on the change in company-specific risk aversion remains unchanged and retains significance.
We conclude that changes in risk aversion significantly affect turnover at the level of individual firms. This result establishes a connection between risk aversion, trading activity, and demand for securities. This is an important finding. It is a test of a widely discussed (refer to Shleifer and Summers 1990) but previously untested hypotheses that changes in preferences toward risk may affect the demand. We also establish that changes in company-specific risk preferences remain to be a significant determinant of the turnover when we control for market-wide changes in risk aversion.
This finding highlights the importance of changes in risk attitude at a company level as a determinant of demand.
Additional Evidence
Changes in risk preferences of investors in a stock are closely related to the demand for shares. When this is the case, stocks that experience similar changes in investor risk preferences may be expected to experience similar shifts in demand and therefore exhibit similarities in their patterns of stock returns and other economic variables that capture stock trading activity. We perform several tests to investigate whether stocks with similarities in the behavior of risk aversion also display similarities along other dimensions. To measure the degree of similarity in risk aversion for two stocks i and j we compute correlation between time series changes in risk aversion for two
This variable measure whether two stocks experienced similar changes in investor risk preferences.
In our first test, we compute correlation between returns on two stocks as a measure of 
IV. Testing for a Structural Break
March 2000 is an important month in the recent capital markets history. It is the month when the recent technology burst. All market indices dropped significantly and all aggregate market trading data experienced a structural shift at this date. Of course, the importance of this date and the prevailing interpretation of it as the date when the bubble burst surfaced after the events.
We use estimates of risk aversion for investors in different technology stocks to assess these events. In the presence of synchronization (or coordination), the structural change in measured investor risk preferences would occur at the same (or very similar) point in time for all technology stocks. If, however, changes in risk preferences for investors in different stocks occur at different points in time, this evidence would suggest the presence of synchronization risk, or co-ordination risk. In the latter case, synchronization risk comes from inability to predict shifts in investor preferences toward different stocks and the resulting shifts in demand. For example, arbitrageurs can observe that on average noise traders are overly optimistic today and hence on average may be expected to be less optimistic in the future, but the arbitrageurs cannot be certain when this shift in preferences will happen. The coordination becomes even more complicated if arbitragers observe different level of optimism or pessimism across different technology stocks. If the significant change across risk preferences occurs during different times for different stocks than this will provide evidence that it was incredibly difficult to predict for how long the market optimism about technology stocks will persist.
We do not take an a priori stand on the date of a structural change. We adopt a flexible approach and let the data determine the date of a structural change for each stock in the sample. We then compare the dates of structural change for different technology stocks. We describe the statistical procedure and empirical results in this section.
Methodology: Wald Test for a Break at an Unknown Date
A test for a structural break at an unknown date has been developed in Bai, Lumsdaine, and Stock (1998 )
The matrix X contains independent variables, so that the row t is
σ is the estimator of 2 σ based on OLS residuals under the alternative hypothesis given k , and the matrix ( )
, where I is a 3 3× identity matrix. The estimated break date is the one that gives the highest F-statistics,
The break date is statistically significant if ( ) k Fˆ is greater than a critical value at the chosen significance level. In our study we use critical values for the test developed in Bekaert, Harvey, and Lumsdaine (2002) . Table V Indeed, as reported by Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) , several hedge-funds pull out from the market in the second half of 1999, but there were also many hedge-funds which increased their holdings of technology stocks during this time. Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002) , Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) and Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) argue that synchronization risk derives from arbitrageurs' uncertainty about when other arbitrageurs will start exploiting a common arbitrage opportunity. This uncertainty is represented by the dispersion of opinion characterized by structural changes in risk preferences in Tables V at different times across different stocks. Therefore, arbitrage was highly risky (if not impossible), and as Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) report, many hedge-funds chose to ride the technology bubble instead of exerting a price correcting force.
Empirical Evidence

V. Testing for Multiple Structural Breaks
Our study of investor risk preferences covers the period from the beginning of 1996 through the end of 2003. If this was the period when US market shifted from a "normal" state into a "bubble period," then experienced the bubble bursting" and a decline (or a "crash"), and finally stabilized, then there may be three points of structural change in risk preference. The first point reflects the shift from a normal market into the "bubble." The second point of structural change corresponds to the bubble bursting, and to the beginning of the decline. The third point corresponds to the end of the period of decline and to the return to the "normal" state. We address the hypothesis of multiple structural breaks taking place at the same time across different securities using the following test for multiple structural breaks.
Methodology: Wald Test for Multiple Breaks at Unknown Dates
We generalize the test for a structural break at an unknown date of Bai, Lumsdaine, and Stock (1998) 
The matrix X contains independent variables, so that the row t is 
Empirical Evidence
The results of the test are presented in Table VI . Technology stocks experience different structural breaks corresponding to the three periods in the life cycle of the firm during the bubble: entering the bubble, the bubble burst and subsequent stabilization. Similarly to evidence reported in Table V , we find that different stocks experienced structural changes at different dates. We find no (AAPL)). These findings support the hypothesis of synchronization risk as a barrier to arbitrage. By looking at individual stocks it was impossible to predict for how long the same attitudes towards the technology stocks will persist, or for how long the market optimism will last. The challenges in predicting investor preferences result in difficulties in forecasting demand for these stocks. Different stocks can be sending very different signals to an arbitrageur who is attempting to forecast appetite for risk and the demand for stocks in the technology sector. When investor risk preferences in each of the technology stocks differ, an arbitrageur may infer from one stock that sentiment toward these securities worsens, while a very similar can signal strong optimism. In the absence of a strong coordination signal, attacking the technology bubble becomes a risky proposition. This finding is in line with recent theoretical work by Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) and with the empirical findings in Temin and Voth (2004) who study the trading by Hoare's Bank during the 1720 South Sea bubble and find evidence consistent with synchronization risk.
Evidence from Aggregate Behavior
The evidence reported above indicates that it was difficult to predict the movements of active investors on the individual stock level. The level of the XCI index itself does not provide any indication of when the bubble can burst. The presence of coordination risk is evident from this data. Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) , however, report that hedge funds had some success in exiting the bubble before prices collapsed. This indicates that hedge-fund managers had some ability to mitigate some of the coordination risk by predicting on average when changes in preference may occur or had the ability to forecast investors' sentiment ).
Can we observe a change in risk preference in our data during the bubble collapse? Was there a signal, albeit a weak one, for hedge funds to pool out? To address these questions we analyze an aggregate risk aversion obtained as equally-weighted average of risk aversion estimates for individual stocks. The motivation for looking at aggregate data is that on individual stock level the marginal investors in different stocks are different and we do not know which one leads the market.
On the aggregate level, however, we can observe and measure a general trend in risk preferences of a marginal investor in the whole market. This represents a general opinion about stocks in the bubble market.
We analyze aggregate risk aversion. Table VII persistence, the best predictor for the future value is based on the recent past. An abrupt change in preferences, therefore, can serve as a signal. If, on average, hedge funds were able to predict the structural change in the markets in April 2000, then they would be able to withdraw from the market before prices fell. Our finding of a major structural change in April 2000 is consistent with the hypothesis where hedge funds were able to forecast the future change in market-level optimism of market sentiment and quit the market before the collapse.
VI. Conclusion
Asset price bubbles may inflate when rational arbitrage forces do not prevent prices from deviating from fundamental values. One of the reasons for arbitrageurs not to attempt actions that force prices to fundamentals may be synchronization risk. This risk arises when arbitrageurs lack the power to offset irrational exuberance unless they can coordinate, or synchronize, their actions. If synchronization is difficult or risky, and when individual arbitrageurs are not large enough to bring down the market on their own, prices may deviate from fundamental values. This approach has been used recently to interpret the rise and fall in prices of technology stocks.
We use a novel approach to study whether synchronization risk was present in the recent NASDAQ technology bubble. First, we develop a measure that reflects an important characteristic of investors in individual technology stocks--an estimate of investor risk aversion. Change in demand associated with change in preferences should cause portfolio rebalancing and subsequently affect trading activity. We then show that this prediction holds and that changes in estimated risk preferences of investors in a stock are closely related to changes in demand for the stock, and to the trading activity in the stock. After demonstrating the robustness of this result, we expect and find the following:
We therefore establish that preferences toward risk on individual stock level are a significant determinant of demand for the stock and of the stock price behavior.
Next, we turn to the recent rise and fall in prices of technology stocks. If the technology price bubble was driven by similar changes in investor attitudes (or sentiment) across the technology stocks than we would expect similarities in the behavior of the estimated risk preferences for investors in these stocks. Specifically, the major event of this period--collapse of prices in March 2000--should be observed in all the measures for all stocks approximately at the same point in time.
In the presence of synchronization risk, however, this will not be the case. Estimated preferences for investors in different stocks will experience changes in different points in time. This will be source of synchronization risk.
We study structural changes in estimates of investor risk preferences. Structural changes do take place in our sample, but they occur at very different points in time for different stocks. This means that similar stocks have different levels of optimism or pessimism and may be exposed to different trading strategies at the same time. This finding is consistent with the presence of synchronization risk. We also find that significant changes in individual risk preferences do not occur during the time of bubble collapse, but rather either before or after the burst. This is not surprising, given the finding of Bakshi and Wu (2006) who report that volatility of the NASDAQ 100 index spiked after the bubble burst, not before. Taking all the results together, we conclude that coordination uncertainty or synchronization risk was very high and the arbitrage was highly risky, if not impossible.
This evidence stimulates the discussion of what has become a signal for market participants to pool out from the market before the prices dropped (Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2004) . It means that some coordination may have become possible right before the markets collapsed. The analysis of individual stocks and the XCI index does not provide a clear answer.
We also find that our measures contain important information about the burst of the bubble in March 2000. The aggregate market preference is obtained as equally-weighted average of the preferences for individual stocks. The advantage of using an aggregate data is that on individual level we do not know which stock (or group of stocks) is more influential in driving the technology prices and sustaining the same level of optimism. The aggregate risk preference experiences a structural shift in April 2000, right after the March of 2000 when the prices peaked for the last time. This is a strong and astonishing result. It suggests that change in aggregate market opinion, the change from market optimism to pessimism, was expected to occur in April. Hedge-funds started withdrawing from the bubble before this happened (Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2004) . We infer that overall, changes in investor preferences and sentiment, and the presence of synchronization risk, made the job of rational arbitrageurs very difficult, risky, or virtually impossible.
Table I Descriptive Statistics for Sample Stocks
The table reports descriptive statistics for the technology stocks in our sample, from the beginning of the sample period (2_Jan-1996) through the end of the sample period (31-Dec-2003) . All selected stocks are members of the Computer Technology Index (XCI). This index trades on American Stock Exchange and contains 30 largest technology companies. To be included in the study, we require that a stock has options traded on it for the sample period. The companies in the table satisfy this requirement. We report market capitalization (in millions of US Dollars) and per share price at the beginning and the end of the sample period. We also report holding period return (HPR) and the minimum and maximum per share prices achieved during this period. All data is adjusted for stock splits. 
, where I is a 3 3× identity matrix. 
